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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________ 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this case we must determine whether the appellant, 
Raytech Corporation ("Raytech"), a corporate offspring of Raymark 
Industries ("Raymark"), is precluded from relitigating the issue 
of its successor liability for Raymark's asbestos liabilities.  
We conclude that Raytech is collaterally estopped from 
relitigating this issue, and will, accordingly, affirm the 
district court's ruling to this effect. 
 I.  FACTS 
 Beginning in the early 1970s, Raymark, known at that 
time as Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., a manufacturer of asbestos-
containing products, was named as the defendant in thousands of 
personal injury complaints around the country.1  As a result of 
this burgeoning asbestos litigation, Raymark suffered a severe 
financial decline.2  In response to its financial woes, between 
                     
1
. By June 26, 1988, Raymark had been named as a defendant in 
more than 68,000 cases. 
2
. In 1981, Raymark had a net worth of $112.4 million.  By 
1985, the reported net worth had dropped to $3.6 million. 
  
1982 and 1988 Raymark reorganized its corporate structure.  
Pursuant to this restructuring, Raybestos-Manhattan became 
Raymark Industries and Raytech, and, significantly, Raytech 
obtained ownership of Raybestos-Manhattan's two historically 
lucrative businesses, but without the drain of the asbestos-
related litigation.3 
                     
3
. The steps in the restructuring are described in graphic 
detail by the United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon in Schmoll v. ACandS, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868, 870-71 (D. 
Or. 1988).  We recount these steps here.  STEP 1:  In 1982, 
Raybestos-Manhattan changed its name to Raymark Industries and 
created Raymark Corporation as a holding company for Raymark 
Industries.  Raymark Corporation's only asset was the stock of 
Raymark Industries.  In 1985 Raymark Industries' assets included 
an operating division, Wet Clutch & Brake, and the stock of a 
German subsidiary, Raybestos Industrie -- Products G.m.b.H. 
("RIPG")  STEP 2:  In June 1986, Raymark Corporation created 
Raytech as a wholly owned subsidiary.  STEP 3:  Raytech then 
created Raysub as a wholly owned subsidiary.  Raytech and Raysub 
were created solely to carry out the merger described in STEP 4.  
See Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 870.  STEP 4:  In October 1986, 
Raymark Corporation merged into Raysub, with Raymark Corporation 
surviving as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raytech.  In this 
merger, each outstanding share of Raymark common stock was 
converted into one share of Raytech stock.  Raytech, designated 
the "holding company," was entirely owned by the former 
shareholders of Raymark Corporation.  As a result of this merger, 
Raytech, the parent of Raysub, became the parent of Raymark 
Corporation.  Raytech then owned 100 percent of the stock of 
Raymark Corporation, which owned 100 percent of the stock of 
Raymark Industries.  STEP 5:  In 1987, Raytech purchased Raymark 
Industries' two most profitable assets, the Wet Clutch & Brake 
Division and the stock of RIPG.  Raytech purchased the Wet Clutch 
& Brake Division for $76 million.  Payment consisted of 
approximately $15 million in cash, $10 million worth of Raytech 
stock at closing with another $6 million in stock to be 
transferred later, and $46 million in unsecured notes.  The Wet 
Clutch & Brake Division, the largest of Raymark Industries' 
business operations, had significant profit potential.  Raytech 
purchased the RIPG stock owned by Raymark Industries for $8.2 
million.  This sale included a cash payment of $3.9 million, with 
the balance financed by an unsecured note.  Significantly, the 
asbestos claims against Raymark Industries did not arise from 
either the Wet Clutch & Brake Division or RIPG.  See id. at 871 
  
 In 1988, Raymond Schmoll brought one of the many 
asbestos-related lawsuits brought against Raymark and Raytech.  
See Schmoll v. ACandS, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868 (D. Or. 1988).  Mr. 
Schmoll sued Raymark and Raytech in the United States District 
Court for the District of Oregon, seeking damages for injuries 
allegedly caused by his inhalation of asbestos dust from products 
manufactured or sold by the defendants.  Schmoll and 
Raymark/Raytech agreed to submit to the district court the 
question whether Raytech was a successor in liability to Raymark 
Industries.  Following receipt of extensive briefing on the 
issue, the district court found that Raytech was a successor in 
liability to Raymark Industries for Raymark's production, sale 
and distribution of products containing asbestos, and that 
Raytech was legally responsible for Raymark's strict liability 
torts.  Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 875. 
 In March of 1989, Raytech filed a petition under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Connecticut.  Raytech then filed this 
adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment that it is 
not liable for the asbestos-related torts of Raymark.  At 
Raytech's behest, the adversary proceeding was transferred to the 
(..continued) 
(footnotes omitted).  STEP 6:  In 1988, Raytech sold Raymark 
Corporation, and thus Raymark Industries, to Asbestos Litigation 
Management ("ALM"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Litigation 
Control Corporation ("LCC"), whose business includes claims 
processing, document control and retention, and other services to 
companies involved in complex litigation, for $1 million.  
Asbestos Litigation Management paid $50,000 in cash and a 
$950,000 unsecured promissory note for all Raymark Corporation's 
assets and liabilities. 
  
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.  
The district court sought briefing on the question of the 
preclusive effect of the Schmoll decision upon Raytech's 
declaratory judgment action, and concluded in light of the 
arguments presented that Schmoll collaterally estopped Raytech 
from relitigating the issue of its successor liability for the 
asbestos-related torts of Raymark. 
 The case was then transferred, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
section 1412, to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.4  In early 1994, the district court 
certified for immediate appeal the Connecticut district court's 
ruling that Raytech was estopped from denying successor 
liability. 
 II. 
  We review for abuse of discretion whether the district 
court properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  
McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing Park Lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 
(1979)).  Our standard of review is not affected by the fact that 
this case involves the application of offensive collateral 
estoppel.5  As the Supreme Court indicated in Park Lane Hosiery, 
                     
4
. 28 U.S.C. § 1412 provides: 
 
  A district court may transfer a case or 
proceeding under title 11 to a district court 
for another district, in the interest of 
justice or for the convenience of the 
parties. 
5
. Offensive collateral estoppel occurs whenever a plaintiff 
seeks to estop a defendant from relitigating an issue which the 
  
the application of offensive collateral estoppel is also within 
the discretion of the trial court.  Park Lane Hosiery, 439 U.S. 
at 331.  Therefore, in reviewing the district court's decision to 
apply offensive collateral estoppel, we are bound by the abuse of 
discretion standard.  Id. 
 Application of collateral estoppel requires 
consideration of a number of factors.  Traditionally, courts have 
required the presence of four factors before collateral estoppel 
may be applied:  (1) the identical issue was previously 
adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the 
previous determination was necessary to the decision; and (4) the 
party being precluded from relitigating the issue was fully 
represented in the prior action.  United Industrial Workers v. 
Government of the Virgin Islands, 987 F.2d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 
1993).  The Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that 
(..continued) 
defendant previously litigated and lost against another 
plaintiff.  Park Lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 
(1979).  In actuality, this case involves, as did Park Lane 
Hosiery, the use of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel.  
The use of offensive collateral estoppel here is said to be "non-
mutual" because Earl White and the other defendants in Raytech's 
declaratory judgment action -- present or future claimants 
against Raytech -- are seeking to bind Raytech to a judgment in a 
previous case -- Schmoll -- to which they themselves cannot be 
bound.  See Id. at 327 n.7 (stating that it is a violation of due 
process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a 
party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be 
heard (citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of 
Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971))).  For the sake of 
simplicity we will refer to the operative concept as "offensive 
collateral estoppel," though it is understood that every 
reference in this opinion to "offensive collateral estoppel" is 
actually a reference to "offensive non-mutual collateral 
estoppel." 
  
collateral estoppel is inappropriate if facts essential to the 
earlier litigated issue have changed.  Montana v. United States, 
440 U.S. 147 (1979).  Finally, in cases involving the offensive 
use of collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court has instructed that 
courts must take special care to ensure that its application does 
not work unfairness to party against whom estoppel is asserted. 
 Of the traditional four factors relevant to collateral 
estoppel, only one -- whether there is an identity of issues -- 
is pressed by Raytech in this appeal.  Raytech also contends, 
however, that facts essential to the Schmoll decision have 
changed, and that the application of offensive collateral 
estoppel would inflict unfairness upon it.  We will address each 
of these arguments in turn.  
 A.  Identity of Issues 
 Raytech concedes that the only element of the four-part 
collateral estoppel test at issue in this appeal is whether the 
issue before the court in Schmoll is identical to the issue 
raised by Raytech in its declaratory judgment action before the 
district court in Connecticut.  To defeat a finding of identity 
of the issues for preclusion purposes, the difference in the 
applicable legal standards must be "substantial."  See 1B Moore's 
Federal Practice ¶ .443[2] at 572 ("To avoid collateral estoppel 
on the ground that the facts found in the first action have a 
different legal significance in the second suit, it is necessary 
to show that the difference in significance is substantial."); 
accord Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crawford Ltd., 937 F.2d 
729, 734 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Issues that may bear the same label are 
  
nonetheless not identical if the standards governing them are 
significantly different."); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad 
Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 459 n.8 (5th Cir. 1971) ("There are 
circumstances when the same historical factual circumstances may 
be involved in the two actions, but the legal significance of the 
fact differs in the two actions because different legal standards 
are simultaneously applicable to it.  This is a very narrow 
exception to the rule with respect to identity of issues, 
however, and is applicable only when there is a demonstrable 
difference in the legal standards by which the facts are 
evaluated.").  To resolve this issue, we must, of course, 
identify the precise question or questions at issue both in 
Schmoll and in this case. 
 In Schmoll, the court faced the issue "whether Raytech 
is liable as a successor for Raymark Industries' production, sale 
and distribution of products containing asbestos."  Schmoll, 703 
F. Supp. at 869.  This issue necessitated a determination of 
whether the transfers of corporate assets resulting in the 
formation of Raytech were designed to escape asbestos-related 
liability.  See Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 872.  In its complaint 
in this case, Raytech states that it seeks "a declaratory 
judgment that it is not liable for the asbestos-related personal 
injury claims asserted against Raymark Corporation and/or Raymark 
Industries, Inc."  Raytech's complaint further specifies that it 
seeks a declaration that "[u]nder the applicable law, neither 
Raytech nor any non-filing subsidiary is a successor in interest" 
to either Raymark Corporation or Raymark Industries. 
  
 At first blush, the issues presented by the two cases 
appear identical.  And while we believe them to be identical in 
the final analysis, we acknowledge that the question of their 
identity is more difficult than it might at first seem. 
 In Schmoll, the court sought to determine whether under 
Oregon law, Raytech was liable as a successor for Raymark's 
asbestos-related liability.  See Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 872 
n.6.  In this case, the district court faced the question 
whether, under some undetermined "applicable law," Raytech is 
liable as a successor for Raymark's asbestos-related liability.  
According to Raytech, in all jurisdictions except the state of 
Oregon, fraudulent conduct in connection with a corporate sale of 
assets must be found before successor liability may be imposed.  
Thus, Raytech contends, in Schmoll, a case decided under Oregon 
law, the court did not decide the very issue presented by this 
case, namely, whether the transactions creating Raytech were 
carried out fraudulently in order to escape liability.  "Any fair 
reading of the Schmoll opinion," Raytech argues, "reveals 
immediately that the Court not only did not decide the fraud 
issue, it obviously did not consider fraud to be an element of 
the `fraudulent transaction' exception under Oregon law."  
 Raytech's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, 
Oregon's law of successor liability is neither substantially nor 
even demonstrably different from the law of successor liability 
applicable in other jurisdictions.  An examination of court's 
analysis in Schmoll reveals that the issue presented and 
determined in Schmoll is identical to the issue presented for 
  
determination in this case.  In Schmoll the court began its 
analysis by stating that "Oregon courts reject transfers of 
corporate assets designed to escape liability."  Schmoll, 703 F. 
Supp. at 872.  The court proceeded to assess the effects of the 
asset transfer involved in the creation of Raytech: 
 Raymark Industries had valuable assets, RIPG 
and Wet Clutch & Brake.  It conveyed these 
assets to Raytech, which was owned by Raymark 
Industries' former shareholders.  This 
transaction left Raymark Industries with 
staggering asbestos liabilities, unprofitable 
operations, unsecured notes, and stock which 
could not be sold in large blocks without a 
deep discount. 
 
  Present and future asbestos tort 
claimants, as Raymark Industries' potential 
creditors, were likewise left with little in 
the transaction.  The money Raytech paid for 
Raymark Industries' profit-generating assets 
will not adequately compensate present and 
future claimants.  If Raytech escapes 
liability for Raymark Industries' torts, 
these creditors will no longer have access to 
Raymark Industries' valuable assets or to the 
potential stream of profits generated by 
these assets. 
Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 873.  Based largely upon these indicia 
of bad intent, the court concluded that although the corporate 
restructuring met the technical formalities of corporate form, 
because they were "designed with the improper purpose of escaping 
asbestos-related liabilities," there was "no just reason to 
respect the integrity of the transactions."  Id. at 874.  Raymark 
had made substantial profits from the production of asbestos-
containing products, and the Schmoll court was not going to let 
it avoid liability by transferring its profitable assets while 
  
leaving of itself "no more than a corporate shell unable to 
satisfy its asbestos-related obligations."  Id. 
 As already noted, Raytech has sought to distinguish 
Schmoll's successor liability analysis from the successor 
liability analysis required in "every other jurisdiction" 
principally by pointing out Schmoll's failure to make an explicit 
finding that the transactions giving rise to Raytech involved 
"fraudulent" conduct.  Again, according to Raytech, in every 
jurisdiction but Oregon, the law requires a specific finding of 
fraud before successor liability may be imposed.  This simply is 
not the case.6  To impose liability on the successor corporation, 
the law in every jurisdiction, including Oregon, requires a 
finding that the corporate transfer of assets "is for the 
fraudulent purpose of escaping liability."  Fletcher Cyclopedia 
of the Law of Private Corporations § 7122 at 232.  The word 
                     
6
. It is a "well-settled rule of corporate law [that] where 
one company sells or transfers all of its assets to another, the 
second entity does not become liable for the debts and 
liabilities, including torts, of the transferor."  Polius v. 
Clark Equipment Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1986).  This then 
is the general rule of successor liability, recognized in all 
jurisdictions:  when a corporation purchases all or most of the 
assets of another corporation, the purchasing corporation does 
not assume the debts and liabilities of the selling corporation.  
See 15 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
§ 7122 at 232.  There are four widely recognized exceptions to 
this general rule.  The successor corporation does inherit 
liability where (1) the purchaser expressly or implicitly agrees 
to assume liability, (2) the purchase is a de facto consolidation 
or merger, (3) the purchaser is a mere continuation of the 
seller, or (4) the transfer of assets is for the "fraudulent 
purpose of escaping liability."  Id.  The parties dispute neither 
the nation-wide applicability of the general rule nor the 
presence in every jurisdiction of the four exceptions. 
  
"fraudulent," as it appears in Fletcher's Cyclopedia, the very 
source cited by Raytech as setting forth the four exceptions to 
successor non-liability "recognized in all jurisdictions" (see 
n.6 supra), characterizes or modifies not the actual means of the 
transfer of assets or the conduct undertaken in furtherance 
thereof, but rather the purpose of such transfer.  Under 
Fletcher's articulation of the exception, transferring corporate 
assets for the purpose, or with the intention, of escaping 
liability is, by definition, a transfer of assets with fraudulent 
purpose. 
 As the district court observed, implicit in Schmoll is 
the finding that the transfer of corporate assets giving rise to 
Raytech, undertaken for the purpose or with the intent of 
escaping liability, was a transfer undertaken with fraudulent 
purpose or intent.  Even though the court in Schmoll omitted the 
word "fraudulent" in the course of its successor liability 
analysis, the indicia of improper purpose upon which the Schmoll 
court largely relied are the same factors that Raytech itself 
acknowledges are generally considered by courts when determining 
whether a transfer of corporate assets was undertaken for the 
fraudulent purpose of escaping liability.  Thus, the issue 
addressed and resolved by Schmoll is "in substance the same" 
issue Raytech has raised in this case; accordingly, we conclude 
that the collateral estoppel doctrine's identity of issues 
requirement is satisfied in these circumstances.  See Montana v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979) (the identity of issues 
  
requirement is fulfilled where the issues in the current case are 
"in substance the same" as those previously resolved).7 
 B.  Change in Facts Essential to Schmoll 
 As noted above, even if all four requirements of 
collateral estoppel are met, changes in "controlling" facts, that 
is, facts "essential to a judgment" will render collateral 
estoppel inapplicable in a subsequent action raising the same 
issues.  Montana, 440 U.S. at 155, 159.  Raytech contends that 
facts essential to the judgment in Schmoll have changed and that 
it should not be collaterally estopped from raising the successor 
liability issue again in this case. 
 Raytech argues that central to the Schmoll court's 
successor liability analysis was its view that Raymark would not 
realize the full benefit of the sale to Raytech of RIPG and Wet 
Clutch & Brake.  Indeed, the Schmoll court observed that at the 
time of the sale of these assets to Raytech, Raymark received the 
                     
7
. Entangled within its argument that Oregon law is outside 
the realm of traditional successor liability law is Raytech's 
argument that Schmoll was simply wrongly decided.  However, we 
need not dwell on this contention.  Any argument that the 
successor liability issue was erroneously decided in Schmoll is 
wholly without relevance to our collateral estoppel inquiry.  "A 
judgment merely voidable because based on an erroneous view of 
the law is not open to collateral attack."  Federated Department 
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).  Not only is 
the argument that Schmoll was wrongly decided irrelevant, it is 
brought before a tribunal thousands of miles from whence it 
arose.  The remedy for a wrongly decided district court case from 
the District of Oregon is, of course, appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
and possible review by the Supreme Court.  Raytech did in fact 
appeal Schmoll to our sister court of appeals -- and lost.  See 
Schmoll v. ACandS, Inc., 977 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1992).  Raytech 
apparently did not seek Supreme Court review. 
  
lion's share of the purchase price in the form of unsecured notes 
and Raytech stock that could not be sold in large blocks without 
a deep discount.  See Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 873.  According to 
Raytech, the facts regarding Raytech's payment for the assets 
purchased from Raymark have changed dramatically since Schmoll 
was decided.  Raytech argues that the evidence available now, 
which was not and could not have been presented to the court in 
Schmoll, establishes that all notes made payable to Raymark by 
Raytech are current and all stock payments have been made in cash 
in lieu of stock at Raymark's request.  Raytech further notes 
that of the $85.1 million Raytech agreed to pay for the assets in 
question, Raytech has paid in excess of $63 million to date.  
Thus, Raytech argues, with these new facts in hand, facts which 
it considers "essential to the judgement" for purposes of 
assessing the applicability of collateral estoppel, the court in 
Schmoll would not have imposed successor liability upon it. 
 We begin by parsing an old, familiar source to acquire 
a sense of what "essential" encompasses in this context.  That 
which is indispensably necessary or requisite is commonly 
referred to as "essential."  See Blacks Law Dictionary 490 (5th 
ed. 1979).  Under the generally accepted meaning of the term, a 
fact may be deemed essential to a judgment where, without that 
fact, the judgment would lack factual support sufficient to 
sustain it.  See id. ("[t]hat which is required for the continued 
existence of a thing" is essential).  What facts were essential 
to the Schmoll decision, is, of course, the question.  To answer 
this question, we turn again to the Schmoll opinion. 
  
 In deciding to impose successor liability upon Raytech, 
the court in Schmoll relied in part upon the presence of direct 
evidence of intent to avoid liability.  For example, the court 
relied upon statements made by participants in the suspect 
transactions indicating that the elaborate transfer of assets had 
been designed specifically to effect the avoidance of liability.  
Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 873-74.  The court noted Raymark's 1985 
annual report, in which the company articulated its long term 
strategy: 
 to protect and enhance shareholder 
investment, to maximize the amounts available 
for deserving asbestos-injured claimants and 
to limit exposure for asbestos claims only to 
businesses currently threatened, thus 
enabling our other businesses and any new 
business opportunities to grow, unshadowed by 
the cloud of asbestos liability. 
Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 873-74.  The court also noted the 
statements of John Kutzler and Craig Smith, holders of various 
high-level positions at both Raymark and Raytech.  Mr. Kutzler 
had stated that the intention of the restructuring "`was to 
remove an asset through different ownership from the exposure of 
the asbestos litigation.'"  Id. at 874.  Mr. Smith testified that 
the restructuring had been designed to insulate Raytech from 
Raymark's liabilities.  Id. 
 The court also examined the overall context of the 
corporate restructuring, finding that it smacked of dubious 
intent.   
 Raymark Corporation changed from the parent 
of Raymark Industries to the subsidiary of 
Raytech to the subsidiary of ALM.  Raytech 
purchased Raymark Corporation's two valuable 
  
assets and then sold the remainder to ALM for 
$1 million.  It is inconceivable that in an 
arms-length corporate transaction, a buyer 
would have purchased an entity [i.e., Raymark 
Corporation] so lacking in assets and laden 
with liabilities. 
Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 874.  The court was also deeply troubled 
by the fact that Raytech was entirely owned by the former 
shareholders of Raymark Industries, so that the exact same 
shareholders who once owned a company, i.e., Raymark Industries, 
possessing both profitable assets and staggering asbestos 
liabilities, now owned a company, i.e., Raytech, possessing 
profitable assets and no asbestos liability.  The ownership of 
ALM, the entity upon which Raytech foisted Raymark's asbestos 
liabilities, also factored into the court's decision to impose 
successor liability.  ALM was a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
Litigation Control Corporation.  Craig Smith was a division 
president at Raymark Corporation from 1980 to 1985.  In 1985, 
Smith became president and chief executive officer of Raymark.  
By the time Schmoll was decided, Smith had become president and 
chief executive officer of Raytech, and had established the 
Litigation Control Corporation.  Moreover, at the time Schmoll 
was decided, Smith owned 45 percent of the shares of the 
Litigation Control Corporation, with his son owning another 15 
percent.  This is precisely why the court doubted the bona fides 
of the sale of Raymark to ALM following the purchase by Raytech 
of Raymark's profitable assets.  While the court also placed some 
emphasis upon the facts that Raytech had passed unsecured notes 
and Raytech stock of questionable value to Raymark as part of the 
  
purchase price for RIPG and Wet Clutch & Brake, the court appears 
to have been equally troubled by the fact that the restructuring 
left Raymark's creditors without access to the potential stream 
of profits generated by RIPG and Wet Clutch & Brake.  See 
Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 873.  This latter concern would have 
been warranted regardless of the value of the consideration 
passed by Raytech to Raymark. 
 Based upon all of these considerations, the Schmoll 
court imposed successor liability upon Raytech.  And for the 
following reasons, we believe the court would have done so even 
if it had known of Raytech's continued payments of its note and 
stock obligations. 
 First, Raytech's contention in this appeal that 
"essential facts" have changed is in fact an updated version of a 
similar argument it made on appeal of the Schmoll decision before 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  In its brief filed 
in the Ninth Circuit, Raytech urged (with citations to the trial 
court record) that the court consider that "[a]s of the time of 
trial, Raytech had paid Raymark each of the note and stock 
payments required by the contracts for the purchase and sale of 
GmbH and WC&B."  Thus, while Raytech has paid substantially more 
of its note and stock obligations since the time of the Schmoll 
trial, and in that sense, certain facts have changed, it cannot 
be argued that the basic fact of Raytech's payment on the notes 
was unknown to the Schmoll court when it imposed successor 
liability. 
  
 We also note that it was not the failure or the 
inadequacy of consideration proffered by Raytech for the purchase 
of Raymark's profitable assets that so deeply troubled the court 
in Schmoll; instead the court viewed the transaction as rife with 
improper intent, due in part to the type of consideration passed.  
Whether Raytech paid on the unsecured notes or not, the notes 
remained unsecured.  And while the Schmoll court relied upon the 
unsecured status of the notes to confirm its view that the 
transaction was not an arm's-length deal, it never per se 
addressed the collectibility of the notes, or the prospect of 
payments being made pursuant to them.  We agree with the 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Raytech Corporation:  had the 
Schmoll court compared the value of the consideration paid by 
Raytech to Raymark to the value of the assets transferred, and 
had it found the value of the former significantly less than the 
latter because of doubts as to the ability or willingness of 
Raytech to honor its obligations, then Raytech's "changed 
essential facts" argument might have force.  Supplemental Brief 
of Appellees Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Raytech 
Corporation at 7.  But that is not what happened.  The Schmoll 
court did not address the likelihood that the notes given by 
Raytech would not be paid. 
 In light of the fact that evidence of payment on the 
notes during the one year preceding the Schmoll trial was placed 
before both the Schmoll court and the Ninth Circuit, coupled with 
the fact that neither the district court in Schmoll nor the Ninth 
Circuit on Raytech's appeal were particularly impressed by the 
  
fact of Raytech's payments, we conclude that Raytech's evidence 
of additional payments on the notes and stock obligations does 
not establish a change in facts essential to the Schmoll 
judgment. 
 C.  Fairness Considerations 
 The Supreme Court has granted district courts "broad 
discretion" to determine when a plaintiff who has met the 
requisites for the application of collateral estoppel may employ 
that doctrine offensively.  See Park Lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 
439 U.S. 322 (1979).  In an attempt to provide general guidance 
as to the exercise of that discretion, the Court explained that: 
 If a defendant in the first action is sued 
for small or nominal damages, he [or she] may 
have little incentive to defend vigorously, 
particularly if future suits are not 
foreseeable.  Allowing offensive collateral 
estoppel may also be unfair to a defendant if 
the judgment relied upon as a basis for the 
estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or 
more previous judgments in favor of the 
defendant.  Still another situation where it 
might be unfair to apply offensive estoppel 
is where a second action affords the 
defendant procedural opportunities 
unavailable in the first action that could 
readily cause a different result . . . .  The 
general rule should be that in cases where a 
plaintiff could easily have joined in the 
earlier action or where, either for the 
reasons discussed above or for other reasons, 
the application of offensive estoppel would 
be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge 
should not allow the use of offensive 
collateral estoppel. 
  
Id. at 330-31 (citations and footnotes omitted).  A finding of 
fairness to the defendant is thus a necessary premise to the 
application of offensive collateral estoppel.8   
 In arguing that it would be unfairly penalized if 
collaterally estopped from relitigating the successor liability 
issue, Raytech places principal reliance, again, upon its 
argument that critical facts have changed.9  As should be clear 
from our prior discussion, we do not agree that facts essential 
to the Schmoll decision have changed.  But it is also beyond 
debate that certain facts have changed.  In the aftermath of the 
Schmoll decision, for instance, Raytech has paid over to Raymark 
considerable additional sums of money.10  The question is, do the 
                     
8
. This notion of fairness reflects the equitable nature of 
issue preclusion generally.  See Jack Faucett Associates v. 
American Tel. & Tel., 744 F.2d 118, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has commented that 
offensive collateral estoppel is "even a cut above [collateral 
estoppel] in the scale of equitable values."  Nathans v. Sun Oil 
Co. (Delaware), 705 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1983). 
9
. Most of the other points Raytech makes in support of its 
fairness argument are, in actuality, attempts by Raytech to 
challenge the Schmoll opinion on the merits.  As for Raytech's 
argument that it could not have foreseen the import of the 
Schmoll case at the time the case was litigated, we agree with 
the district court that the record only serves to belie this 
position and suggests instead that Raytech was well aware of the 
stakes involved in Schmoll.  The Schmoll court itself observed 
that the parties submitted thousands of pages of documents and 
deposition transcripts for its consideration regarding the 
successor liability issue.  See Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 869. 
10
. According to Raytech, Raytech has paid Raymark over 
$63 million to date for the sale of RIPG and Wet Clutch & Brake.  
While we do not know how much of this money Raytech has paid 
since the handing down of the Schmoll decision, we think it safe 
to conjecture that Raytech has paid over to Raymark several tens 
of millions of dollars since Schmoll was decided.  
  
factual changes that have occurred render the application of 
collateral estoppel unfair to Raytech?  We do not think so. 
 In the wake of Schmoll, Raytech has had every incentive 
to act in a manner so as to fortify its argument that it should 
not be collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of its 
successor liability.  Moreover, equitable appearances have, no 
doubt, been shaded to Raytech's advantage as a result of its 
continued payments on the unsecured notes.  However, while we 
fully understand that it would be unfortunate from Raytech's 
perspective were the district court's application of collateral 
estoppel allowed to stand, we fail to see how such an eventuality 
might be deemed "unfair" to Raytech as that term is utilized in 
Park Lane Hosiery.  We have already concluded that the Schmoll 
court would reach the same result were it now presented with the 
issue of Raytech's successor liability, changes in facts 
notwithstanding.  The necessary implication of this conclusion is 
that Raytech will suffer absolutely no unfairness should the 
district court's application of collateral estoppel stand. 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 Having found the requisite identity of issues, and 
having concluded that essential facts have not changed between 
the time Schmoll was decided and the time the district court 
applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this case, we 
cannot but conclude that the district court did not abuse its  
  
discretion in barring the relitigation of Raytech's successor 
liability.  We will, therefore, affirm.  
_________________________ 
 
 
